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ARTICLES
THE EVOLUTION OF NEPA IN THE FIGHTAGAINST CLIMATE CHANGERobert Reiley*
I. INTRODUCTIONThe National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) is the firstenvironmental charter of the United States.  Signed into law on January 1,11970, NEPA addresses the need for overarching national environmentalguidance in the country. During the course of its forty year history, NEPA hasbeen used to challenge a wide range of federal actions including the issuanceof operating permits under the Clean Air Act,  the approval of forest2management plans approved under the National Forest Management Act,  the3
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4. 23 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).5. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a (2006).6. City of Los Angeles v. Nat’l Highway Transp. Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990).7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.8. The only agency that has a limited exemption from NEPA is the U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency, under the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974. The Act exempts EPA forits actions under the Clean Air Act, 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1). Additionally, under the Clean Water Act, EPAis exempted from the obligations to prepare an EIS on some actions, 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1).9. BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN & TECH., at 16 (Alfred A. Knopf ed.,Bantam Books 1982) (1971).
construction of highways under the Federal-Aid Highways Act,  and the4issuance of oil leases under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.  Given the5breadth of NEPA’s applicability, it was inevitable that NEPA would becomea tool to combat climate change. The use of NEPA to require federal agenciesto take a “hard look” at greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions makes perfectsense because many federal actions directly or indirectly contribute to GHGemissions. Since 1990, in City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA,  plaintiffs have used6NEPA, successfully and unsuccessfully, to challenge federal actions thatmight have an impact on the global climate.The attraction of using NEPA as a sword to combat climate change liesin the Act’s holistic approach to review of federal actions. Unlike the CleanAir Act  and other single medium statutes, NEPA applies to all federal actions7and agencies.  NEPA’s holistic application is an acknowledgment of the8interconnected relationship that is unique to the Earth. Indeed, you cannotunderstand the impact that a federally-approved logging road will have on anecosystem unless you know something about soil erosion, water quality, airimpacts, biodiversity, and species endangerment. Climate change is no lesscomplex. Federal decisions related to oil exploration, transportation projects,coal-fired power plants, forest management, and others have an impact onclimate. As noted ecologist Barry Commoner stated in his book, The ClosingCircle, there is one ecosphere for all living organisms and what affects one,affects all.  That is, “everything is connected to everything else.” It is this9interconnectedness that NEPA requires to be examined.This article explores and analyzes the various uses of NEPA as a statutorytool to combat climate change. The article begins by first providing anoverview of the NEPA statutory requirements. Second, in order to provide abackdrop for the case law that has come out of NEPA’s enforcement, thearticle provides a review of both climate change science and the regulatoryactions conducted in response. Third, the case law related to NEPA climatechange litigation is surveyed. Fourth, an analysis of that case law within the
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10. 42 U.S.C. § 4331.11. 42 U.S.C. § 4333.12. 42 U.S.C. § 4341.13. For instance Section 101 recognizes “the profound impact of man’s activities on theinterrelations of all components of the natural environment” and that “each person should enjoy a healthfulenvironment . . . and to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment.” See 42 U.S.C.§§ 4331(a) & (c).14. See 42 U.S.C. § 4335. See also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,435 U.S. 519 (1978), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 1034 (1982), rev’d on other grounds, 462 U.S. 87 (1983).15. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (2010).16. Id.
context of the NEPA regulations is conducted. Fifth, a review of the draftCEQ guidance on Assessing GHG Impacts from Proposed Federal Actions isassessed. Sixth, a proposed congressional response is appraised. Lastly, theimpact on future litigation is considered.II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACTOverviewNEPA has three main components: provisions articulating nationalenvironmental policies and goals,  provisions that require federal agencies to10implement those policies and goals,  and finally a section that establishes the11Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”).  NEPA’s policies and goals are12broad, general, and inspirational.  NEPA requires federal agencies to give13environmental factors the same consideration as other factors in their decisionmaking process. To ensure that such policies are obeyed, NEPA requires CEQto ensure that Federal agencies meet their obligations under the Act.While the requirements of NEPA are mandatory, they are largelyprocedural in nature and supplement existing legal requirements of federalagencies.  The CEQ regulations require agencies to integrate NEPA14requirements from the beginning of the project planning process to ensure thatthe decision making process reflects environmental values, avoids delays, andreduces conflict.  Moreover, these statutory and regulatory requirements are15interdisciplinary in approach and require the development of appropriatealternatives to recommended courses of actions.16
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17. C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010).18. Intrinsic to NEPA is the “rule of reason,” which ensures that agency discussions focus on issuesthat merit discussion and deemphasize issues that do not advance an understanding of issues or decision-making process regarding the proposal, its alternatives, and mitigation measures. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(f)& (g), 1501.7 & 1508.25 (2010).19. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.20. A FONSI is a report that establishes why the agency determined that there are no significantenvironmental impacts expected to occur upon implementation of the action, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.3.21. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7.22. Among other things, the scoping process identifies significant issues that require substantiveanalysis in the EIS, identifies other environmental requirements that need to be integrated into the process,and establishes a schedule for the EIS and decision on the proposed action. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7.23. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13 (2010).24. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
The NEPA ProcessThe NEPA process begins when a federal agency develops a proposal forwhich it will take action, for example, a permit, license, or request ofapproval. Once the agency has developed a proposed action, it must thendetermine whether that action will be the subject of a Categorical Exclusion(“CE”), an Environmental Assessment (“EA”), or an Environmental ImpactStatement (“EIS”). A proposed action is the subject of a CE if the agencyconcludes the action or actions do not either individually or cumulatively havea significant effect on the quality of the human environment.  If the proposed17action does not qualify for a CE, the agency must prepare an EA or an EIS.18The EA helps determine the significance of the environmental impacts of theproposal and assesses alternative means of achieving the agency’sobjectives.  The EA process ends with either a Finding of No Significant19Impact (“FONSI”) or a requirement to prepare an EIS.20A federal agency must prepare an EIS if it is proposing a federal actionthat it determines will significantly affect the quality of the humanenvironment.  The EIS process starts with publication of a Notice of Intent21(“NOI”) in the Federal Register. The purpose of the NOI is to announce theagency’s intent to prepare an EIS for the proposal at issue while providingbasic information about the proposal, in preparation for the scoping process.22The next major step in the EIS process is the release of the draft EIS for publiccomment. There are a number of key components in the draft EIS. The“Purpose and Need” statement explains why the agency action is necessary.23In this statement, the agency must identify and evaluate alternative ways offulfilling the need of the proposed action.  If an agency has a preferred24alternative at the time it publishes a draft EIS, the draft must identify that
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25. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e).26. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7 & 1508.8.27. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.28. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1116(D.C. Cir. 1971).29. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2.30. Calvert Cliffs’, 449 F.2d at 1116.31. Id. at 1111.
alternative.  The agency must analyze the full range of direct, indirect, and25cumulative effects of the preferred alternative, if any, and of the reasonablealternatives identified in the draft EIS.  Moreover, appropriate mitigation26measures must be included in the draft EIS.27When the public comment period is finished, the agency analyzescomments, conducts further analysis as necessary, and prepares the final EIS.28The agency then publishes the final EIS and the Environmental ProtectionAgency will publish a Notice of Availability in the Federal Register. TheROD, or Record of Decision, is the final step for agencies in the EIS process.The ROD is the written record of the agency’s decision. It identifies thealternatives considered, including the environmentally preferred alternative,and discusses mitigation plans, including any enforcement and monitoringcommitments.29 A New Cause of ActionCalvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States AtomicEnergy Commission (Calvert Cliffs’)  is one of the most influential cases in30the area of environmental law, especially with regard to NEPA. Calvert Cliffs’originally arose as a challenge to a nuclear power plant that was slated forconstruction in Calvert Cliffs, Maryland. The plaintiff argued that the rulesadopted by the federal Atomic Energy Commission did not satisfy the rigordemanded by NEPA because, unlike NEPA, the agency’s rules did not requireevaluation of the environmental impacts of proposed nuclear power plants. Inresponse, the defendants argued that the vagueness of NEPA leaves room foragency discretion. Ultimately, the court sided with the plaintiff and held theCommission must revise its rules governing consideration of environmentalissues.Calvert Cliffs’ represents the first time a federal court found NEPA tocreate a cause of action against federal agencies that do not comply with theAct’s directives.  The court held that federal agencies must consider31environmental issues just as they consider other matters within their
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32. Id.33. Id.34. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Endangerment & Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gasesunder Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/downloads/Federal_Register-EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0171-Dec.15-09.pdf.35. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)(where this principal was applied).36. Id.37. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).38. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 937 (1984).
mandates.  As the court correctly noted, this was only the beginning of a32flood of new litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting the naturalenvironment.33III. THE SCIENCE BEHIND CLIMATE CHANGE, THE REGULATORY ACTIONSIMPLEMENTED IN RESPONSE AND THE POLICY BEHIND THEMContrary to what some detracted may claim, the regulatory actionsundertaken by the United States’ government have, in fact, made in responseto very real scientific evidence of climate change. For the purposes of this
2paper, the most relevant scientific research is the increasing levels of COconcentrations and the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange (“IPCC”). The EPA, in response to this body of research, its owninvestigations and the work done by other federal agencies, universities andnon-profits promulgated a document entitled: “Endangerment and Cause orContribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the CleanAir Act.”34Underlying the EPA’s finding is “the precautionary principal.”  This rule35requires action to avoid serious or irreversible potential harm, despite lack ofscientific certainty as to the likelihood, magnitude, or causation of that harm.As applied to environmental policy, the precautionary principle requires thatfor significant changes to the environment such as deforestation or dams, theburden of proof lies with those who oppose the implementation of additionalenvironmental protection measures to address a potential problem. Theprecautionary principle is explicitly recognized in American jurisprudence.36Consequently, those who would challenge the EPA’s regulations mustovercome not only Mead  and Chevron,  but also this fundamental principal.37 38
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39. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_annmean_mlo.txt (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).40. 15 U.S.C. § 2931 (2010).41. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., supra note 39.42. United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change, available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/2627.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).43. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., supra note 39.44. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).45. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., supra note 39.46. See Endangerment & Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under § 202(a) of theClean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I).47. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., supra note 39.
2CO  Concentrations
2Carbon dioxide (CO ) concentrations and climate change have long been2linked in the discussion of global climate change. When CO  atmosphericlevels were first monitored in 1959, the mean concentration was 315 parts permillion (ppm).  Since then, they have continued to rise in spite of increasing39global awareness of the climate change implications. By the time NEPA wasenacted in 1970, the mean concentration rose to 325 ppm. By 1990, when theU.S. Global Change Research Program,  wrote its first report on climate40
2change, the mean concentration of CO  in the atmosphere was 354 ppm.  By41the time the U.N. Convention on Climate Change  was ratified by the U.S.42Senate and signed into law by President Bush in 1992, the mean concentration
2of CO  in the atmosphere was 356 ppm.43On April 2, 2007, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion inMassachusetts v. EPA,  holding that greenhouse gases are air pollutants44
2covered by the Clean Air Act, the mean concentration of CO  in theatmosphere was 383 ppm.  By 2009, when EPA issued its endangerment45finding under the Clean Air Act, where it found that six greenhouse gasestaken in combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare
2of current and future generations,  the mean concentration of CO  in the46 2atmosphere was 387 ppm.  As a result of these rising CO  concentration47levels, both the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and EPAhave concluded that these levels have an adverse impact on Earth’s climate.Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Findings
2As the data on increasing levels of CO  concentrations increased involume and quality, the scientific community began to respond. Climate
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48. IPCC was established by the United Nations Environment Programme and the WorldMeteorological Organization in order to give the world a scientific view on the current state of climatechange and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts. See Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change, Org., http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).49. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, History, http://www.ipcc.ch/ organization/organization_ history.shtml (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).50. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 49.51. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).52. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 49.53. Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report,Observed Changes in Climate & Their Effects (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms1.html.
science, like any legitimate scientific undertaking, is an iterative process. Itcircles back on itself such that useful ideas are built upon and used to learneven more about a particular topic. This often means that successiveinvestigations of a topic lead back to the same question, but on a morenuanced level. In the scientific process all ideas are tested with evidence fromthe natural world. Moreover, members of the scientific community play animportant role in this process by “peer reviewing” the ideas and evidence ona particular topic.This iterative process has been a hallmark of the Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change (“IPCC”). The IPCC is a scientific body reviews andassesses the most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic informationproduced worldwide relevant to the understanding of climate change.  It does48not conduct any research nor does it monitor climate related data orparameters. Rather, its function is to review relevant information so as toensure an objective and complete assessment of that information.The IPCC issued its first assessment report in 1990,  which played a role49in the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange. Its second assessment report in 1995  was instrumental in the50adoption of the Kyoto Protocol  in 1997. The third assessment report was51issued in 2001, and the fourth was published in 2007.  With each succeeding52report, the global community gets a better understanding of climate change.In its Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007, the IPCC concluded,inter alia, that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is nowevident from observations of increases in global average air and oceantemperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global averagesea level.”53
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54. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Causesof Change (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms2.html.55. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 54.56. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, ProjectedClimate Change & Its Impacts (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms3.html.57. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 56.58. Id.59. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, the Long-Term Perspective (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms5.html.60. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).61. Fed. Reg., supra note 46.
Moreover, the fourth report stated: “there is very high confidence that thenet effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming.”  Most of54the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20thcentury is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHGconcentrations.  In addition, the assessment noted that “continued GHG55emissions at or above current rates would cause further warming and inducemany changes in the global climate system during the 21st century that wouldvery likely be larger than those observed during the 20th century.”56Some of those changes would include “warming greatest over land andat most high northern latitudes and least over Southern Ocean and parts of theNorth Atlantic Ocean,”  reduced snow cover area, and an increased frequency57of hot extremes, heat waves and heavy precipitation. The report noted that keyvulnerabilities may be associated with many climate-sensitive systems,including food supply, infrastructure, health, water resources, coastal systems,ecosystems, global biogeochemical cycles, ice sheets and modes of oceanicand atmospheric circulation.  As a result, the impacts of climate change are58very likely to impose net annual costs, which will increase over time as globaltemperatures increase.59EPA’s Endangerment FindingIn response to findings such as those of the IPCC and to the SupremeCourt’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,  the EPA issued a final rule60entitled “Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for GreenhouseGases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act.”  The rule contains two61major conclusions. First, the EPA found that the current and projectedconcentrations of the six key well-mixed greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide
2 4 2(CO ), methane (CH ), nitrous oxide (N O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),6perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF ), in the atmosphere
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62. Id. at 66510–12.63. Id. at 66524–26.64. Id. at 66497.65. Id. at 66498.66. Id. at 66498–99.67. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d at 6.
threaten the public health and welfare of current and future generations.Second, the EPA found that the combined emissions of these well-mixedgreenhouse gases from new motor vehicles contribute to the greenhouse gaspollution, which threatens public health and welfare.The EPA reached these two conclusions based on the body of scientificevidence, which included work of the EPA, other federal agencies,universities, and international bodies, including the work of the IPCC, relatedto this issue.  It found that the effects related to climate change include, but62are not limited to, more persistent and extreme heat waves, more intensewildfires, reduced agricultural yields, increased drought, more frequentdownpours and flooding, damage to aquatic resources, and reduced diversityin wildlife and ecosystems.  Additionally, the EPA found that the impacts on63public health include “reduced air quality, increases in temperatures, changesin extreme weather events, increases in food- and water-borne pathogens, andchanges in aeroallergens.”64Moreover, “certain groups, including children, the elderly, and the poor,are most vulnerable to these climate-related health effects.”  EPA concluded65that the evidence provides compelling support for finding that greenhouse gasair pollution endangers the public welfare of both current and futuregenerations, and that the risk and the severity of adverse impacts on publicwelfare are expected to increase over time.66Underlying this finding and the regulations promulgated in its name is the“precautionary principle.”  As indicated earlier, this principal requires action67to avoid serious or irreversible potential harm, despite lack of scientificcertainty as to the likelihood, magnitude, or causation of that harm. In thecontext of global climate change, this puts the burden of proof on those whooppose the implementation of additional environmental protection measuresto address a potential problem.The most significant component of the precautionary principle as appliedto environmental litigation is its applicability to potentially irreversibleactions, such as the effects associated with climate change. The Earth’sclimate is a large, complex non-linear dynamical system. As a result, theincrease in temperature may be much greater and faster than estimated. This
2011] EVOLUTION OF NEPA IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE 11
68. Id.69. See Mass., 594 U.S. 497, at 506 n.7 (citing Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 6) (“[T]he Clean Air Act‘and common sense . . . demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certainthat harm is otherwise inevitable.’”).70. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–87 (2006) (prohibiting discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts underClean Water Act § 101(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3)).71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–29 (2006) (requiring premanufacture review of new chemical substancesprior to their introduction into the marketplace under Toxic Substances Control Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 2604).72. 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (2006) (pesticides must be registered with EPA, Federal Insecticide,Fungicide & Rodenticide Act § 136a).73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (2006) (a national policy that hazardous wastes will be treated, stored,and disposed so to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment, underResource Conservation & Recovery Act § 1003(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (2006) (Authority for EPA to respond to “a release or substantialthreat of release . . . of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial dangerto public health or welfare” under Comprehensive Envtl. Response, Comp., & Liab. Act § 3, 42 U.S.C.§§ 9604(a)(1)(B).).
may cause even more damage to the Earth’s ecosystem and cause greaterhuman distress than expected. Moreover, it may also be very difficult toreduce temperatures even with a significant reduction in the emission ofgreenhouse gases.The precautionary principle is explicitly recognized in Americanjurisprudence.  As recently as Massachusetts v. EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court68reaffirmed this principle under the Clean Air Act.  In addition to the Clean69Air Act, the concept of precaution is embedded in a number of environmentalstatutes as well. For instance, the Clean Water Act,  the Toxic Substances70Control Act,  the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act,  the71 72Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,  and the Comprehensive73Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,  to name a few,74all incorporate precaution into their statutory frameworks. In addition to thoseacts, NEPA exemplifies precautionary action. Namely, NEPA stressesforethought and attention to consequences by requiring an EIS for anyfederally-funded project, along with mandating consideration of alternativeplans. Consequently, in view of the scientific evidence, NEPA, with itsholistic framework, interdisciplinary approach, precautionary outlook, is anexcellent vehicle to review federal actions that might have an impact onclimate.Taken together, the science behind climate change, the findings of theIPCC, the EPA’s final rule and the precautionary principal create a situationthat is ripe for litigation. As the following case summary indicates, when thecompliance requirements of NEPA are added into the mix, the floodgates oflitigation are thrown open.
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75. City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 475.76. Id. at 478.77. Id.78. Id. at 481.79. Id. at 482.
IV. CASE LAW UNDER NEPA RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGEOverviewClimate change litigation under NEPA rarely has just one plaintiff andone defendant, nor is the litigation typically about just one issue. Climatechange may be just one of many issues that a plaintiff raises. As such, thislitigation typically requires the examination of several statutes. It may alsorequire the court to review multiple federal actions. Moreover, NEPAlitigation often touches upon procedural issues such as standing to sue.Because there is a mix of procedural and substantive issues, these cases arevery difficult to categorize. As a result, a meaningful analysis of these casesrequires that each case be examined on its own merits. Only by looking atthese cases in the aggregate do certain patterns emerge that provide for aroadmap for future litigants.City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety AdministrationIn City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA,  New York City, Los Angeles, the75State of California, Public Citizen, Union of Concerned Scientists, the Centerfor Auto Safety, and the Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”)collectively challenged the National Highway Transportation SafetyAdministration’s (“NHSTA”) decision not to prepare an environmental impactstatement (“EIS”) in developing the Corporate Average Fuel Economy(“CAFE”) standards as required the 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act(“EPCA”).76This case concerned the NHTSA’s decision, based on its EA, that itsproposed rule would not significantly affect the quality of the humanenvironment and hence it did not have to prepare an EIS under NEPA.  In a77per curiam opinion, the court held that although the petitioners had standingto sue under the CAFE standards for model years (“MYs”) 1987–88 underNEPA [based upon the defendants’ obligations under the Clean Air Act(“CAA”)].  The petitioners’ challenges failed on the merits.78 79
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80. Id.81. Id.82. Id.83. Id. at 493.84. Id. at 494.85. Id.86. Id.87. Id. at 495.88. Id.89. Id.
This case is important to the litigation history of NEPA, not because ofits ultimate finding, but rather because the court recognized that car emissions,a “new and potentially catastrophic environmental phenomenon” in globalwarming, “fit squarely into the broad NEPA framework.”  The case is also80noteworthy both because the court recognized that the petitioners had standingand how the court reached this conclusion.  To establish standing in a case81alleging that an agency failed to follow NEPA, a plaintiff must show that thechallenge fits within NEPA’s zone of interest requirement. To do so, the courtheld that a litigant must show he was adversely affected or aggrieved by thefailure to comport with NEPA’s requirements and that the aggrieving actionis covered by NEPA’s congressional mandate.82In this case, NRDC met its burden. NRDC argued that the agency’sfailure to prepare an EIS created the risk that it would overlook global climatechange effects that could come from lower fuel efficiency standards for MY
21989, especially the effects from increased CO .  The court found that NRDC83had established that a serious environmental harm, global warming, was atstake.  Next, the court noted that NRDC had proven that its members have a84sufficient geographical nexus to the location where the consequences are mostlikely to be felt.  Without an EIS evaluating consequences of the CAFE85standards, the uncertainty of the real environmental impact will remain. Thus,the court recognized NRDC was aggrieved under NEPA and it thereby hadstanding.86NRDC’s challenge met the zone of interest requirement under NEPAbecause its concerns about global warming fall under the broad congressionalmandate of NEPA.  The court found that while the environmental problems87associated with increases in global temperatures were complex, the resultantharms were real and undisputed enough to fall within the areas of specificcongressional concern.  As a result, the court held that NRDC was aggrieved88within the zone of interest to be protected.89
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90. Id.91. Id. (this portion of the case has been overruled by Florida Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d658, 669 (D.D.C. 1996)).92. Id. at 498.93. Id.94. Founds. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1992).95. Admin. Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–706 (2006).96. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. at 395.97. Id. at 397.98. Id. at 396.
Finally, the court addressed whether NRDC must establish that theincremental impact of the emissions from the CAFE rollback has a significanteffect on global warming for standing purposes to prove causation.  Judge90Wald asserted that to meet the causal nexus standard, a petitioner only needsto show that the alleged injury is “fairly traceable” to the proposed action.91Since NRDC had presented evidence that further information might influenceNHTSA’s decision, the court held that it had established a causal nexus.92Although the NRDC overcame the hurdle of standing, ultimately NHTSAwon the case. In writing for the majority of the court on the merits, Judge D.H.Ginsberg found that NHTSA did not prepare an EIS because it believed thatthe impact of its CAFE decision would not have a significant impact on theenvironment.  The court agreed with NHTSA’s decision not to prepare an93EIS and the petitions for review were denied.Foundation on Economic Trends v. WatkinsIn Foundation On Economic Trends v. Watkins,  the plaintiffs sued the94Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of theInterior under NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  The95plaintiffs asked the court to declare forty-two actions of the defendantsunlawful. They argued that the defendants authorized, approved, or fundedprograms and actions that contributed to or ameliorated the greenhouse effectwithout discussing and evaluating the impacts of those contributions inenvironmental documentation, review, and decision-making. Therefore, theactions violated NEPA.  The court held that the plaintiffs lack standing to96challenge the defendants’ failure to comply with NEPA under either theinformational injury or environmental injury approach.  The court granted the97defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and denied the plaintiffs’ motionto amend their complaint.98
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In its standing analysis, the court noted that litigants must meet both theconstitutional requirements for standing and the requirements imposed byCongress in the APA to obtain judicial review of agency action under NEPA.99Under the Constitutional standing analysis, a plaintiff must allege that hispersonal injury is fairly traceable to the alleged unlawful conduct of thedefendant and must show that his injury likely will be redressed by the reliefrequested.  Additionally, where there is a challenge to a federal agency’s100compliance with NEPA, the Plaintiffs’ right to judicial review is governed by§ 10(a) of the APA.101In an attempt to establish standing, the plaintiffs relied on the doctrine ofinformational standing. This doctrine stems from a footnote in Scientists’Institute for Public Information. Inc., v. Atomic Energy Commission, authoredby Judge Skelly Wright.  Scientists’ Institute for Public Information Inc. and102other cases suggest that an organization may have informational standingwhen an organization asserts a plausible link between an agency’s actions, theinformational injury, and the organization’s activities, and where theorganization can point to concrete ways in which their programmatic activitieshave been harmed by an infringement on the right to information on theenvironmental effects of government actions created by NEPA.103In the case at hand, the plaintiffs argued that they suffered injury to theirinformation dissemination activities due to the defendants’ failure to addressthe effects of various federal actions on global warming under NEPA.  The104plaintiffs further argued that they were harmed in disseminating informationto the public because of the defendants’ failure to consider the effects of suchfederal actions.105The court began by criticizing the informational standing doctrine, in partby noting that it goes against the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that a plaintiffneeds to have more than a mere interest in a problem to confer standing.106Further, the court stated that Plaintiffs’ claim of informational injury is“virtually indistinguishable from an ideological interest in the problem of
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global warming that, without more, is insufficient to confer standing.”  In so107stating, the court essentially held that an informational injury does not qualifyas an environmental consequence of an agency’s failure to comply with NEPAand therefore, it is not a distinct and palpable injury for standing purposes.108After finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the court denied theplaintiffs’ motion to amend their compliant.  The court was not persuaded109by the plaintiffs’ collective reliance on one of the individual plaintiff’s in thecase by the name of Rifkin. While the court agreed that an injury to anindividual’s recreational use or aesthetic enjoyment of the environment willconfer standing under NEPA, the court held that Rifkin must show that he hasa direct stake in the outcome of the forty-two federal actions challenged inorder to invoke the power of the court to review them under NEPA.  The110court found that Rifkin failed to meet this burden.  Thus, the remaining111plaintiffs could not acquire standing through Rifkin.Seattle Audubon Society v. LyonsIn Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons,  the plaintiffs sued the Secretary112of Agriculture and the Secretary of Interior for a 1994 forest managementplan. In addition to NEPA, the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960,113the National Forest Management Act,  the Endangered Species Act,  and114 115the Clean Water Act  were also implicated in the lawsuit. The case centered116on the proper management of 24 million acres of federal land in Washington,Oregon, and northern California, which is home to the northern spotted owl.117In addition to raising concerns specifically directed at protecting the owl,plaintiffs also raised issues involving climate change.  However, the court118expressly held the Forest Service EIS (“FSEIS”) adequately considered theimpacts of timber harvest on water quality, air quality, and climate change.119
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As a result, the FSEIS’s discussion on climate change complied with NEPAand its regulations.  Moreover, the court determined that the entire forest120plan was within the bounds of the law.121Association of Public Agency Customers v. BonnevillePower AdministrationIn APAC Inc., v. Bonneville Power Administration, the Association ofPublic Agency Customers (“APAC”) filed suit against the Bonneville PowerAdministration (“BPA”), a federal agency under the Department of Energy,for violations under NEPA and several other causes of action.  BPA was122created to market low-cost hydroelectricity generated by federal facilities inthe Pacific Northwest and is governed by four statutes: the Pacific NorthwestElectric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980, the Pacific NorthwestFederal Transmission System Act, the Pacific Northwest Consumer PowerPreference Act, and the Bonneville Project Act.123In 1992, BPA started negotiations on new power purchase contracts andengaged in a parallel environmental review process to assure that it was incompliance with NEPA.  The Final Business Plan, published in June 1995,124discussed six alternatives that would help BPA adapt to changing electricutility standards.  In August 1995, BPA adopted the Market-Driven125alternative under its Record of Decision (“ROD”) rather than one of theenvironmentally preferred alternatives.126Petitioners identified nine reasons why the Business Plan EIS failed toadequately consider a number of adverse environmental effects that wouldresult should the BPA adopt the Market Driven Plan.  Doing so would127relieve direct service industries, which purchase power directly from BPA, ofstranded cost liability and permit them transmission access.  One of the nine128reasons was focused on the impact the Business Plan would have on climate
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change.  Specifically, the petitioners asserted that the Business Plan EIS129failed to consider impacts on the Canadian environment, in violation ofExecutive Order 12114. Executive Order 12114 requires agencies to developprocedures that take extraterritorial impacts to global commons into accountin major federal actions.130Further, the petitioners claimed that the Business Plan EIS did not discussglobal warming implications. The petitioners alleged that NEPA required suchan assessment because the Market Driven plan would result in increased directservice industries operations, which would in turn lead to an increase in theeffects of greenhouse gases. The Business Plan EIS was also alleged to havefailed to discuss trans-boundary impacts of continued Canadian gasexploration.  As with the other eight reasons, the court found that the131concerns raised by the petitioners were insufficient to hold the EISinadequate.  With respect to the climate change concern in particular, the132court found the EIS did examine the environmental impact to increased direct
2service industries operations including CO  output.133Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department of EnergyBorder Power Plant Working Group v. Department of Energy134concerned two applications, one for Presidential Permits and federal rights-of-way. These permits were required for construction on electricity transmissionlines within the U.S. and across the U.S.-Mexico border, connecting newpower plants in Mexico with the power grid in southern California, to begin.The threshold issue in the case was whether the power plants were withinthe scope of the NEPA review.  The court found that the plants were not135“projects” subject to U.S. jurisdiction because they are located outside of theU.S.  However, the court said the Mexican power plants might still be136important to the environmental analysis required for the NEPA review of thetransmission lines because if the permits are granted, the plants might causeadverse environmental effects. The court relied on Sylvester v. U.S. Army
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Corps of Engineers  to determine whether the transmission lines and the137power plants would exist in the absence of the other. The court said that whilethe proposed action did not include the operation of the Mexican powerplants, the question was really whether the scope of the NEPA review shouldinclude these power plants due to effects of the transmission lines.  This138determination had to be made because Ninth Circuit precedent required thatthe effects be causally linked to the proposed federal action for NEPA torequire consideration of those effects in an EA or EIS.139Since there were different factual circumstances to be considered for eachpermit, the court stated that it would consider the permits separately.  The140court found that the BCP transmission line was a but-for cause of thegeneration of power at the EBC turbine and that the TDM plant was also an“effect” of the T-US transmission line because both the EBC turbine and theTDM plant existed primarily to supply electricity to these transmissionlines.  Therefore, the emissions resulting from the operation of the EBC141turbine are effects of the BCP line and must be analyzed under NEPA.  The142court found, however, that the two turbines in the LRPC and the EAX turbine,which almost exclusively generated power for Mexico, were not causallylinked to the BCP line and therefore their emissions did not have to beassessed under NEPA.143Next, the court decided whether the agencies acted arbitrarily when theyissued a “Finding of No Significant Impact” as required by the APA’s causeof action.  First, the court held that the agencies did not act arbitrarily by not144considering whether emissions from the plants would violate the Clean AirAct.  Second, the court found that the agencies did not act arbitrarily in145issuing the FONSIs because ozone pollution was uncertain and the court wasnot in a position to resolve disagreements among scientists as tomethodology.  Third, the agencies did not take the required “hard-look” at146the impacts of the proposed actions on the Salton Sea, an ecologically critical
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area.  Fourth, the court found that DOE had not adequately responded to147comments concerning the water and air impacts of the power plants.  Fifth,148the court found that the Mexican plants were not subject to local U.S. airpollution laws and the power plants need not be considered in the decision-making process.Finally the court decided that the EA was inadequate as a matter of lawbecause it did not disclose the significance of the plant emissions and thoseemissions had potential environmental impacts that were indicated in therecord.  For example, the EA underestimated the emissions from the TDM149
2plant and did not evaluate CO  for global warming impacts or ammonia forpublic health impacts from these emissions.  The court found that the EA150was also inadequate because it did not provide a range of reasonable andfeasible alternatives. The analysis of alternatives is essential to anenvironmental analysis. The court stated, however, that the EA adequatelyconsidered the cumulative impact of the TDM and LRPC emissions.  Neither151the EA or the FONSI discussed the action’s cumulative impact on waterquality and quantity in the New River or Salton Sea.  Therefore, the court152found the whole cumulative analysis in the EA to be inadequate because it didnot consider the combined impacts of future, specific power plants in theregion, and the cumulative impact on water resources.153Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation BoardIn Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board,154several different groups of petitioners challenged a decision of the SurfaceTransportation Board (“STB” or “Board”) which gave final approval to theDakota, Minnesota, & Eastern Railroad Corporation’s (“DM&E”) proposedconstruction of 280 miles of rail line. The construction was to consist of a newline, which would reach the coal mines of Wyomings’ Powder River Basin(“PRB”), and upgrades to 600 miles of existing rail lines.  The petitioners155argued that the Board’s approval violated 49 U.S.C. § 10901 (which gave the
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Board the exclusive authority for the construction and operation of rail lines),NEPA, the National Historic Preservation Act,  and the Fort Laramie Treaty156of 1868. While the court found that the Board should prevail on most issuesat trial, it remanded the decision back to the Board for further consideration.157One group of petitions (the City of Rochester, the Mayo Foundation, andOlmstead County) made nineteen separate arguments that the Board failed toact pursuant to NEPA in matters related noise, traffic, location, cost,vibrations, derailments, and terrorist attacks, to name a few.  The court158concluded, however, that the Board acted pursuant to NEPA while remandingon several issues.  The court decided that the SEA did not take a hard look159at the issue of horn noise mitigation because the only mention of this was ina footnote in the FSEIS.160A second set of petitioners, the Mid States Coalition for Progress, arguedthat the SEA failed to include and analyze different possible routes for thenorthern alignment of the new track as project alternatives and only focusedon the southern alignment.  The court disagreed and held the SEA met its161requirement under NEPA under which it only had to consider reasonable andfeasible alternatives.162A third petitioner, the Sierra Club, argued that SEA failed to consider theeffects on air quality caused by an increase in the supply of low sulfur coal topower plants, made possible by the new stretch of track.  An increase in coal163consumption would increase the emissions of other noxious air pollutants such
2as nitrous oxide, CO , particulates, and mercury, which were not then and arenot currently capped under the CAA.  The court concluded that NEPA164requires federal agencies to consider any adverse environmental effects  and165under the CEQ regulations,  this includes both direct and indirect effects.166 167DM&E asserted that things such as coal usage were speculative.  The court168
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noted, however, that while the extent of the effect was speculative, the natureof the effect of an increase in coal was not.169That is, the proposed project would increase the long-term demand forcoal and with that would also increase adverse effects resulting from burning
2coal, like CO  emissions.  Contrary to DM&E’s assertion, the agency may170not simply ignore the likely effect of the increased burning of coal.  The171CEQ regulations devise a specific procedure for evaluating reasonablyforeseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment when therewas incomplete or unavailable information.  Therefore, the agency must172include this procedure in its EIS, and evaluate the effects that increased coalconsumption will have on the environment before the project could beapproved.173The court did find that the Board complied with § 106 of the NHPA.174The court found that all parties had an adequate opportunity to include publiccomments under NHPA and that the public was encouraged to comment on allaspects of the DEIS.175The Sioux argued that the Board violated the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868and breached the government’s fiduciary duty to them when it licensed theconstruction of the new extension without first obtaining the Sioux’sconsent.  The Court found that the treaty was not applicable because176DM&E’s proposed line would not pass through any present-dayreservations.177 Senville v. PetersIn Senville v. Peters,  the Vermont Public Interest Research Group,178Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club, and Conservation Law Foundation sued theAdministrator of the Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”) and theSecretary of the Vermont Agency of Transportation (“VTrans”). The plaintiffssought a declaration that FHWA violated NEPA, and other laws, by approving
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and funding Segments of A-B of Chittenden County Circumferential Highway(“CCCH”). Further, the plaintiffs sought an order requiring FHWA towithdraw its approval of CCCH and an injunction against ground-disturbingwork of segment A-B.  The court found that the plaintiffs met their burden179on a number of these issues and enjoined construction of the project until thedefendants fully complied with NEPA.180Preliminarily, the court agreed with the plaintiffs and found that the FinalRevised EA (“FREA”) was inadequate.  Under NEPA case law, federal181agencies are required to consider alternatives to a proposed action even whena full EIS is not prepared.  While the FREA contained an “alternatives”182section, it did not look at alternatives to the project and only consideredchanges to the selected alternative.  Because of this, the FREA was in183violation of both NEPA and CEQ regulations.  With respect to segmentation,184the court found that segments A-B did have independent utility and wouldserve the purposes of reducing traffic volume and improving traffic flow.185In addition to challenging the adequacy of the FREA, the plaintiffs alsoargued that the defendants 
failed to consider, or inadequately considered: (1) significant new environmental impactsassociated with a fundamental change in the phased construction of the project;(2) significant new air quality impacts; (3) significant new water quality impacts;(4) significant new impacts to rare, threatened, and endangered species; (5) significantnew environmental justice impacts; (6) significant new noise impacts; and (7) significantnew induced growth impacts.186In response, the court first deferred to the decision of the FHWA thatphased construction would not result in significant impacts that had not beenstudied.  From there, the court dealt with the allegations relating to air187quality impacts, which the plaintiffs claimed failed to consider new
2circumstances and information related to CO  emissions and global warming,hazardous air pollutants, particulate matter, and ozone.  On this issue, the188
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court found that while these specific studies were desirable, they were notrequired.  Thus, NEPA had not been violated by the failure to conduct the189studies.190Similarly, the FWHA was determined to have taken a hard look at newinformation regarding water quality.  Therefore, its decision that water191quality impacts were expected to be less than what was thought in 1986 wasneither arbitrary nor capricious.  The court found that this assessment was,192in turn, an adequate basis upon which to support its finding that no species inquestion would suffer a significant impact.  The court determined that193FHWA also took a hard look at noise impacts in the FREA and its decisionthat an SIS was not required was not arbitrary or capricious.194The agency’s finding, however, that no additional or new significantindirect or cumulative impacts were found to be arbitrary and capricious.195The agency engaged in no discussion related to the indirect impacts toagricultural lands, induced growth, or other cumulative impacts.  As a result,196the court held that the environmental documentation for the project waslegally inadequate.197 Friends of the Earth v. WatsonIn Friends of the Earth v. Watson,  the plaintiffs sued Peter Watson,198President and CEO of Overseas Private Investment Corp. (“OPIC”), PeterMerril, Vice Chairman and First Vice President of the Export-Import Bank ofthe U.S. (“Ex-Im”) for failure of the OPIC and Ex-Im to comply with the APAand NEPA when funding particular projects that contribute to climatechange.  The defendants immediately moved for summary judgment on the199following bases: (1) lacking of standing; (2) lack of final agency actions; (3) a
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claim that OPIC’s organic statute precludes judicial review; and (4) a claimthat OPIC is not subject to NEPA.200The defendants contended that the plaintiff lacked standing because theinjuries alleged were insufficient.  The defendants argued that the plaintiff201could not show an injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability.  However, the202court disagreed and found that the plaintiffs only needed to show that it isreasonably probable that the challenged action will threaten their concreteinterests.203In response to the claim that there was no injury-in-fact, the plaintiffsargued that it was undeniable that the projects would have significantconsequences.  Even though the defendants contested the credibility of the204plaintiff’s evidence, the court determined that the plaintiff’s evidence wassufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that emissions fromdefendants’ projects will threaten the plaintiff’s concrete interests.  The205court then held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently established causation.  The206court pointed to evidence linking the defendants to certain energy projects.207Ex-Im and OPIC both stated that these projects would not have proceededwithout their support and participation.  Therefore, summary judgment on208the issues of injury-in-fact and causation was inappropriate.209The plaintiffs were also found to have met the redressability requirementfor standing.  Neither OPIC nor Ex-Im conducted environment assessments210under NEPA.  As a result, the court found that the plaintiff’s had shown211redressability because they demonstrated that the defendants’ decisions couldbe influenced by further environmental studies.  Thus, the court, by212compelling the defendants to conduct the assessments required by NEPA,could provide sufficient redress for the plaintiffs alleged injuries.213
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Having disposed of the plaintiff’s alleged lack of standing, the court nextturned to the defendants’ claim that there was no final agency action. Thedefendants’ argued that the plaintiffs were not challenging a final agencyaction and instead were making a broad programmatic challenge.  However214the court found that the plaintiffs’ challenges were not overly broad orprogrammatic because OPIC’s organic statute did not preclude judicialreview.  The statute is silent as to judicial review and the defendants failed215to clearly demonstrate that Congress intended to preclude this type of judicialinquiry.216Finally, the court held that the environmental procedures under OPIC’sstatute did not displace NEPA.  The defendants pointed to Ninth Circuit case217law that precluded NEPA review in some instances.  However, the court218noted that the record did not evince Congressional intent preclude NEPA.219As a result, the court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.220Mayo Foundation v. Surface Transportation BoardIn Mayo Foundation v. Surface Transportation Board,  the court221affirmed the Surface Transportation Board’s (“STB”) decision to approve theDakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corp’s (DM&E) railroad constructionproject.  The appellants challenged the STB’s approval of the DM&E’s222proposed construction of 280 miles of new rail line, which would reach thecoalmines of Wyoming’s Powder River Basin (“PRB”), as well as the upgrade600 miles of existing rail line along Minnesota and South Dakota.223Appellants argued that the STB’s approval violated 49 U.S.C. § 10901 andNEPA.  The court denied the appellants’ challenge.224 225
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Following STB’s approval, the court reversed the STB’s approval for itsfailure to comply with NEPA.  The court remanded the case back to the226Board for it to reconsider its decision on two issues; (1) to stop short ofimposing mitigating conditions of horn noise and (2) to consider expectedeffects of increased coal consumption.  On remand the STB issued both a227supplemental environmental impact statement (“DSEIS”) and a finalsupplemental environmental impact statement (“FSEIS”). STB subsequentlyapproved the project.228Appellants, the Mayo Foundation, City of Rochester, and OlmsteadCounty then argued that DM&E’s acquisition of I&M Rail Link (“IMRL”)constituted “significant new circumstances” and should have been consideredas an alternative route for purposes of the NEPA analysis.  The court found229that the STB’s prior decisions, which found that the IMRL was not areasonable alternative to the DM&E’s route through Rodchester, thoroughlyexplained its conclusion for it not investigating the IMRL as an alternativeroute.  Therefore, the STB was not required to consider the environmental230impacts of IMRL and the STB’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or anabuse of discretion.231Appellants Rochester and Olmstead County argued that STB should haverequired DM&E to fund measures for the establishment of quiet zones inRochester, to build sound walls, and to install noise insulation at placessubject to adverse levels of horn noise.  On remand, the STB again did not232impose horn noise mitigation other than requiring DM&E liaisons to assist inthe establishment of quiet zones.  The court found that STB sufficiently233addressed this matter on remand when it adopted the rationale in its FSEIS,which showed that there were no instances where a railroad was required tofund a quiet zone or other horn noise abatement program.234Appellant Sierra Club argued that the STB had not adequately addressedthe expected increase in consumption of PRB coal, and the correspondingincrease in emissions from that coal, which would likely result due to the
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availability of a shorter and cheaper distribution route.  Therefore, the Sierra235Club argued, the STB did not handle this issue correctly on remand.  This236aspect of the case had been remanded by the circuit court because it had foundthe STB wrong in arguing that such effects were too speculative given theCEQ regulations for evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverseeffects on the human environment.  The court also remanded the case back237in order for the Board to consider the effects of other pollutants, including
2nitrous oxide, CO , particulates, and mercury.238On remand, the STB used the Energy Information Administration’sNational Energy Modeling System (NEMS).  Using NEMS, the STB239concluded that increases in such emissions would be less than one percent.240The court rejected the Sierra Club’s argument and said that the STBextensively discussed the potential impacts on air quality that may result fromthe project’s implementation on remand.  Further, the court stated that the241STB adequately considered the reasonably foreseeable significant adverseeffects of increased coal consumption.  As a result, the court affirmed the242Board’s decision.243Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of the InteriorIn Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior,  the244Department of Interior (“DOI”) began the formal administrative process toexpand leasing areas in the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) for offshore oiland gas development for the years between 2007–2012.  The five-year245leasing program included the expansion of previous lease offerings in theBeaufort, Bearing, and Chukchi Seas off the coast of Alaska.  Appellants246argued that the leasing program violates the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
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Act (OCSLA),  the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”),  and NEPA.247 248 249Petitioner’s NEPA claims centered around two issues: (1) the leasing programviolated OCSLA and NEPA because DOI failed to take the effects of climatechange into consideration; (2) the leasing program violated OCSLA andNEPA because DOI failed to conduct a sufficient biological baseline on theseas.The court addressed the NEPA claims by first looking at the justiciabilityof the petitioners’ climate change and baseline data claims under NEPA.250The petitioners argued that DOI failed to account for present and futureimpacts of climate change on the program areas and the impact of climatechange of the additional consumption caused by the program.  The court251held that these NEPA claims were not ripe because of the multiple stageprocess of the leasing program.  Case law indicated that NEPA obligations252mature only when an agency reaches a critical stage of a decision which willresult in irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources to such anaction.  The leasing program at issue in the case had not reached this critical253stage because at the time petitioners filed their petition, DOI had approved theprogram but no lease-sales had occurred.  As a result, any harm to the254petitioners caused by the need of waiting for the issue to ripen would beoutweighed by the harm done to the DOI by pressing these issues before theywere justiciable.255 Friends of the Earth v. MosbacherIn Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher,  the plaintiffs, Friends of Earth,256Greenpeace, and others, sued the Overseas Private Investment Corporation(“OPIC”) and the Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (“Ex-Im”) under the APAand NEPA for projects that these agencies funded which emitted GHGs. Theplaintiffs asserted that the defendants needed to conduct an environmentalreview under NEPA before they provided funding for such projects. Further,
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the plaintiffs argued that the defendants must take a “hard look” at the GHGemissions from these projects.  Those project included: (1) Chad-Cameroon257Pipeline Project; (2) Sakhalin Oil Field Project; (3) West Seno I and II Oil andGas Fields Projects; (4) Cantarell Oil Field Project; (5) Hamaca Heavy CrudeOil Project; and (6) Dezhou Coal-Fired Power Plan Project.258Both OPIC and Ex-Im had developed climate change reports, whichconcluded that their projects were not significant contributors to climatechange.  The plaintiffs argued that both agencies had supported and259continued to provide financial assistance to international fossil fuel projectsthat emit GHGs.  Plaintiffs claimed that these GHG emissions did have a260significant effect on the domestic environment.  The plaintiffs filed motions261for summary judgment and the defendants filed cross-motions for the same.262Preliminarily, the plaintiffs argued that the projects were major federalactions subject to NEPA because of the amount of financing provided andbecause of the environmental guidelines imposed in connection with thatfinancing.  As the court noted, significant federal funding can transform a263state or local project into a major federal action.  To determine if a project264qualifies as a major federal action under NEPA, both the nature of the federalfunds used and the extent of federal involvement must be assessed.265To this end, the court then analyzed the scale of the defendants’ projects,the amounts of their loan guaranties, and the percentage of the projects’ totalcost that came from the loans.  Additionally, the court looked at the nature266of the defendants’ involvement and whether they imposed conditions alongwith their financing.  If the defendants’ amount of financing did not267influence the scope of the project, the defendants did not possess sufficientcontrol or the responsibility necessary to make these projects major federalactions.  The court held that the information in the record was insufficient268to establish whether the defendants possessed the necessary control over the
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decision-making process.  The plaintiffs had failed to show that any of the269projects qualified as major federal actions.  However, the defendants failed270to prove that their projects did not qualify as major federal actions.271Therefore, the court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment.272The plaintiffs argued that collectively the defendants have supported 162other fossil fuel fired power plants around the world that were not identifiedin the second amended complaint.  The defendants countered that the273plaintiffs failed to sufficiently identify these other projects.  The court held274that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient information about the total costsof these projects or the level of control and responsibility the defendants hadover these projects.275Having determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove any of theundertakings to be major federal projects subject to NEPA with sufficientcertainty to warrant summary judgment, the court readily disposed of theplaintiffs’ remaining claims. The plaintiffs had argued that since the sevenprojects identified in their compliant represented actions that were“cumulative,” the defendants should have prepared a single EIS underNEPA.  Given that since that the court could not determine whether the276individual projects in the complaint qualified as major federal actions, thecourt found that it could not decide whether any of these actions would qualifyas cumulative actions for purposes of summary judgment.  However, the277court did note that the Ninth Circuit has generally found that a single EIS forcumulative actions is required when there is a geographical or temporal nexusamong the actions or when an agency may have divided a project into multipleactions.278Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunctiondirecting the defendants to prepare an EA or an EIS for each and every fossilfuel project they may approve in the future.  The court stated it is impossible279
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to assert that each project that the defendants may undertake in the futurewould trigger NEPA.280North Slope Borough v. Minerals Management ServiceIn North Slope Borough v. Minerals Mgm’t Service,  plaintiffs North281Slope Borough (“NSB”) and the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission(“AEWC”) filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the sale by theUnited States of certain oil and gas leases located in the Beaufort Sea. Thatsale was approved the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) and theDepartment of Interior. The plaintiffs argued that MMS’s decision not tosupplement a 2003 environmental impact statement (“EIS”) was arbitrary andcapricious, and therefore violated NEPA.282The plaintiffs argued that higher oil prices, the cumulative impact ofclimate change, and increased industry interest in the Beaufort Sea and polarbears were new circumstances that required a SEIS.  Further, plaintiffs283argued that if a lease sale were to be permitted, plaintiffs’ subsistenceactivities would suffer irreparable harm from the effect of seismic testing onwhales, waterfowl, seals, and caribou.  Plaintiffs argued that the public284interest in ensuring that federal agencies comply with federal environmentallaws overrides possible economic harm, which could result from temporarilyenjoining the sale.285The defendants countered that that MMS was not required to prepare aSEIS because the 2003 EIS was based on generous development scenarios anda lease sale did not present a materially different assessment of environmentalimpact from what was stated in the 2003 EIS.  Further, defendants argued286that any injury is only speculative and the public interest would be harmed byenjoining the sale.287The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction becauseit determined that MMS’s FONNSI was not arbitrary and capricious and theAgency did take a hard look at the plaintiffs’ concerns prior to issuing this
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finding.  The court reiterated that the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and288must show they are entitled to a preliminary injunction.  The court stated289that the plaintiffs would unlikely win this motion because while NEPArequires agencies to take into account all environmental considerations, it doesnot require that they should elevate environmental concerns over others.290The court found that most of the plaintiffs’ concerns were considered invarious scenarios of the 2003 EIS and therefore were not new or unanticipateddevelopments.  Given the Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act (“OCLSA”),291the Marine Mammal Protection Act and its regulations, significant harmwould unlikely result from the sale. The court gave deference to the agency’sexpertise and experience and found that the balance of hardships weighs infavor of the defendants who invested time and money in preparing for thelease sales.  Further, the court held that if it issued an injunction, it would be292relying on mere speculation.293Audubon Naturalist Society v. Department of TransportationIn Audubon Naturalist Society v. Department of Transportation,  the294Audubon Naturalist Society commenced an action for injunctive anddeclaratory relief under NEPA, the Department of Transportation Act,  the295APA, and the Clean Water Act, (“CWA”).  The Audubon Society contested296the proposed highway project, the Intercounty Connector (“ICC”) whichconnects I-95/US1 in Prince George County, MD and 1-270 in MontgomeryCounty, MD. The Environmental Defense Fund and Sierra Club challengedthe ICC and sought injunctive and declaratory relief under the Safe,Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act(“SAFETEALU”),  the Federal-Aid Highways Act,  NEPA, the APA, and297 298the CAA.299
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The plaintiff’s climate change arguments centered on the Federal-AidHighways Act (“FAHA”) and NEPA.  They claim that the FHWA violated300FAHA by failing to make a determination that the proposed ICC was in thebest overall public interest.301Plaintiffs contended that the defendants did not consider climate changeand air pollution impacts.  However, the court found that the defendants did302consider these impacts. For instance, the defendants found that there wouldbe no new violations of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards as aresult of the ICC.  As a result, the court held that the defendants had303adequately considered these potential adverse effects.  Moreover, the court304found that in response to comments, the FHWA explained that the “issue ofglobal climate change is an important national and global concern that is beingaddressed in several ways by the Federal government.”  The record showed305that the response went on to say that the agency believed it was not useful to“consider greenhouse gas emissions as part of the project-level planning anddevelopment process,” since there are “no national regulatory thresholds forgreenhouse gas emissions or concentrations that have been establishedthrough law or regulation.”306The court concluded that the defendants did not act arbitrarily orcapriciously in concluding that no particular mitigation is needed here for thesupposed impacts of a single stretch of highway on the global problem ofclimate change.  Consequently, the court found that the defendants followed307the mandates of NEPA and the section 109(h) regulations in considering theenvironmental effects and alternatives.  The court also held that the308defendants acted according to NEPA in its conclusion that the ICC project isin the “best overall public interest.”309
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Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway TransportationSafety AdministrationIn Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA,  appellants challenged the310National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) finalrule, titled “Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks, Model Years2008–2011.”  The appellants, Center for Biological Diversity, challenged the311final rule under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”),  and312NEPA. In their first climate change challenge, the appellants’ contended thatthe rule was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to EPCRA because itscalculation of the costs and benefits of alternative fuel economy standards
2assigns zero value to the benefit of CO  emissions reductions.313The court found that the NHTSA’s failure to monetize benefits of GHGemissions reductions was arbitrary and capricious for several reasons.  First,314the record showed that there is a range of values where mitigating climatechange emissions have an estimated positive benefit and the value of carbonemissions reductions is not zero.  Second, NHTSA gave no reason for why315it believed the range of values presented to it was “extremely wide.”  Third,316NHTSA’s reasoning is arbitrary and capricious because it has monetized otheruncertain benefits, such as the reduction of criteria pollutants, crash, noise,and congestion costs, and the value of increased energy security.  Finally,317NHTSA’s conclusion that commenters did not reliably demonstrate thatmonetizing the value of carbon reduction would have affected the stringencyof the CAFE standard is contrary to the record.  The Court found that318NHTSA’s decision not to monetize the benefit of carbon emissions reductionwas arbitrary and capricious, and remanded to NHTSA for it to include amonetized value for this benefit in its analysis of the proper CAFEstandards.319Appellants also argued that NHTSA’s Environmental Assessment isinadequate under NEPA because it does not take a “hard look” at the GHG
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implications of its rulemakings and does not analyze a reasonable range ofalternatives or examine the rule’s cumulative impact.  The court found that320NHTSA clearly has statutory authority to impose or enforce fuel economystandards under the EPCA, and it could have exercised its discretion in settinghigher standards if an EIS contained evidence that so warranted.  The CAFE321standard will affect the level of the nation’s greenhouse gas emissions andimpact global warming. As a result, the EPCA does not limit NHTSA’s dutyunder NEPA to assess the environmental impacts, including the impact onclimate change. EPCA’s goal of energy conservation and NEPA’s goals toprotect, restore, and enhance the environment are complementary.322The court next examined the EA to determine whether it had adequatelyconsidered the possible consequences of the proposed agency action whenconcluding that the action will have no significant impact on the environment.The court also addressed whether NHTSA’s determination that no EIS isrequired is a reasonable conclusion.  The court found that the EA’s323cumulative impacts analysis was inadequate.  The court noted that the fact324that climate change is largely a global phenomenon that includes actionsoutside of the agency’s control does not release the agency from the duty ofassessing the effects of its actions on global warming within the context ofother actions that also affect global warming.  The cumulative impacts325regulation specifically provides that the agency must assess the “impact of theaction when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable futureactions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or personundertakes such other actions.”  The impact of greenhouse gas emissions on326climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPArequires agencies to conduct.327The court concluded that NHTSA’s FONSI was arbitrary andcapricious.  Therefore, the court found that the agency must prepare an EIS328because the evidence raises a substantial question as to whether the Final Rulemay have a significant impact on the environment.  Petitioners have raised329
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a “substantial question” as to whether the CAFE standards for light trucksfrom model years 2008–2011 “may cause significant degradation of somehuman environmental factor,” particularly in light of the compelling scientificevidence concerning “positive feedback mechanisms” from GHG emissionsin the atmosphere.  Moreover, NHTSA failed to provide a convincing330statement of reasons for its finding of insignificance.  The EA did not331provide a “statement of reasons” for a finding of no significant impact, or a“convincing statement of reasons.” Moreover, there was no analysis orstatement of reasons in the section of the EA that discusses environmentalimpacts.332Montana Environmental Information Center v. U.S. Bureau ofLand ManagementIn Montana Environmental Information Center v. U.S. Bureau of LandManagement,  the plaintiffs, the Montana Environmental Information333Center, the Oil and Gas Accountability Project, and WildEarth Guardians,filed a complaint and alleged violations of the Federal Land Policy andManagement Act (“FLPMA”),  the Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”),  NEPA,334 335and Department of the Interior Secretarial Order 3226, which directs theBureau of Land Management (“BLM”) to consider and analyze potentialclimate change impacts when making decisions about public lands. Accordingto the complaint, the BLM did not follow the directive of the order when itapproved certain oil and gas leases. The complaint further alleged that theplanning and decision making process for the lease sales failed to addressGHG emissions by quantifying and reducing methane and other emissions.336On March 12, 2010, the parties settled the lawsuit and the BLM agreedto suspend certain oil and gas leases, which would allow the BLM to conductfurther review of the leases under NEPA.  Such review will, in accordance337
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with the CEQ regulations integrate other environmental review procedures tothe extent required by other federal statutes, regulations, and agency policiesand procedures including FLPMA, MLA, and Secretarial Order 3226. As aresult of this settlement, BLM must, for the first time, conduct climate changereviews along with other environmental assessments required by federal law.V. CASE LAW ANALYSISA. Climate Change is within the Purview of NEPAThe primary commonality throughout all of the cases is that effects fromvarious projects on climate change do fit within the rubric of NEPA. As thecourt in City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA stated, the new and potentiallycatastrophic environmental phenomenon presented by global warming fitssquarely within the broad framework of NEPA.  In addition, the court in that338case took note of the precautionary aspects under NEPA. That is, thelegislative intent behind NEPA is to anticipate and predict the environmentaleffects of a proposed action before it takes place.  Moreover, the court339specifically found that while the timing and scope of injuries from globalwarming are uncertain, it is worse not to evaluate its possible consequencesin an EIS.  As a result, climate change is considered “reasonably340foreseeable” and should be taken into account in the review of any applicablefederal proposal.341Other courts also echoed the theme that NEPA requires consideration ofclimate impacts. In Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department ofEnergy,  the issue addressed by the court was whether the projects at issue342
2should be evaluated for the CO  emissions that would potentially result.  The343court held that such emissions need to be assessed.  In Mid States Coalition344for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board,  the court also found that345federal agencies must evaluate projects that are likely to result in the increase
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2of CO  emissions.  The court in Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA,346found that the failure to monetize benefits from reductions in GHG emissionswas arbitrary and capricious.347While the plaintiffs in the above cases were not always successful in theirchallenges, it is nevertheless important to note that none of the courts foundthat climate change, global warming, or GHG gas emissions were not withinthe scope of review of NEPA. For instance, in Seattle Audubon Society v.Lyons, the court expressly held that the FSEIS at issue adequately consideredthe impacts of climate change related to a forest management plan.  The348court in APAC Inc. v. Bonneville Power Administration, held that the EIS at
2issue properly examined the environmental impact of CO  input related toincreased direct service industries operations.  In Center for Biological349Diversity v. U.S. Department of the Interior, the court found that the plaintiffs’claims under NEPA related to climate change impacts from an oil leasingprogram were not ripe.  The court in Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, held350that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation was subject to NEPA for
2projects they funded that could increase CO  emissions.  In North Slope351Borough v. Minerals Mgm’t Services, the federal district court found that theagency took a hard look at the plaintiffs’ concerns, including those related toclimate change, before it issued the FONNSI.  The court in Audubon352Naturalist Society v. Department of Transportation found that the agency didaccount for the plaintiff’s concerns related to climate change for theconstruction of a new highway project.353Only in Senville v. Peters did the court find that an evaluation of climatechange effects was not required related to a proposed road constructionproject.354 B. Direct and Indirect Effects Must Be ExaminedThe NEPA regulations recognize two types of effects: direct and indirect.Direct effects are “those caused by the action and occur at the same time and
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place.”  Indirect effects are “those caused by the action and are alter in time355or further removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.356Moreover, indirect effects “may include growth inducing effects and othereffects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use, populationdensity or growth rate, and related effects on air and water and other naturalsystems, including ecosystems.”  The regulation further states that “effects357includes ecological (such as the effects on natural resources and oncomponents, structures, and functioning of affected ecosystems), aesthetic,historic, cultural, economic, social, or health, whether direct, indirect orcumulative.”  Both the IPCC reports  and EPA’s Endangerment Finding358 359 360found that the net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one ofwarming. Moreover, as both the IPCC and EPA note in their reports, thiswarming is expected to result in widespread adverse environmental effects.361The courts have effectively adopted a posture that these direct andindirect effects must be examined. For instance, in Center for BiologicalDiversity, the court found that the proposed CAFE standards for a certainclass of vehicles would have a direct effect of GHGs.  Additionally, the362court noted that the defendant agency did not disagree that improved CAFE2standards could have a significant effect on CO  emissions in the atmosphere,which could impact climate change.  Likewise, the court in Mid States363Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board, found that a proposalto construct and upgrade a rail line to reach coalmines in Wyoming’s PowderRiver basin required federal agencies to consider direct and indirect effectsunder the NEPA regulations.  In that case, those effects are the increase in364the long-term demand for coal, and any effects that result from burning coal,
2such as CO  emissions.365
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C. Cumulative Impacts Must Be AssessedUnder the NEPA regulations promulgated by CEQ, “cumulative impact”is defined “as the impact on the environment which results from theincremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, andreasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency or personundertakes such other actions.”  The regulations further provide that366“cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectivelysignificant actions taking place over a period of time.”  This definition367accurately describes human-induced climate change, which is nothing morethan a series of human activities that have resulted in higher temperatures andcorresponding ecological affects. Moreover, the courts also view a cumulativeimpact analysis as a necessary component of any NEPA review related toclimate change.In Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, the plaintiffs argued that theNHTSA did not take a “hard look” at the GHG implications of it CAFEstandards rulemaking and did not examine the rule’s cumulative impact.  The368court held that the EA’s cumulative impact analysis was inadequate.  In369particular, the court noted that even though climate change is a global issue,this does not release an agency from its duty to assess the effects of its actionson global warming.  The cumulative impact regulation requires such an370assessment. Moreover, the court noted that the impact of GHG emissions onclimate change is precisely the kind of cumulative impact analysis that NEPArequires agencies to conduct.371The court in Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department ofEnergy, found that the agency must analyze under NEPA the construction andoperation of power plant turbines in Mexico that provide power to the UnitedStates as well as the transmission lines in the United States, because both thepower plants and the transmission lines might have direct or indirectenvironmental effects, including climate change.  The court remanded the372action back to the agency because the entire cumulative impact analysis failedto include these necessary evaluations. The impact analysis also did not
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2include an evaluation of CO  emissions from these projects and did notconsider the combined impacts of future power plants in the region.373D. The Role of UncertaintyAs previously noted, NEPA is one of the best national examples ofprecautionary action, since it stresses forethought and attention toconsequences. Moreover, its regulations anticipate that there may be data gapsin decision making and evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverseeffects on the human environment. NEPA requires “the agency shall alwaysmake clear that such information is lacking.”  Furthermore, “reasonably374foreseeable” adverse effects include “impacts which have catastrophicconsequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that theanalysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is notbased on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason.”  For instance,375while the IPPC’s Fourth Assessment Report on Climate Change in 2007376finds that it is very likely that over the past fifty years cold days, cold nightsand frosts have become less frequent over most land areas, and hot days andhot nights have become more frequent,  the report only found that it is likely377that heat waves have become more frequent over most land areas.  This378means that in the case of the former finding there is a greater than 90 percentprobability of occurrence, while in the case of the latter finding there is agreater than 66 percent probability of occurrence.  This is the type of379uncertainty that the NEPA regulations expect will be built into any analysis.Moreover, the courts have conclusively held that even uncertain effects mustbe analyzed under NEPA.For example, in determining whether the plaintiffs had standing under thecausation element in City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, the court noted that toobtain standing, a plaintiff only needs to show that the alleged injury is fairlytraceable to the proposed action.  To require a high level of certainty is380
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wrong, since the legislative intent of NEPA is to anticipate and predict theenvironmental effects of a proposed action before it takes place.  For381instance, in Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface TransportationBoard, the court rebuffed the defendant’s suggestion that increased coal-usewould result because of the proposed rail project was speculative, and foundthat the effects of increased coal-use related to climate change was notspeculative.  Moreover, the court noted that the agency could not ignore such382an effect and the CEQ regulations devised a specific procedure for evaluatingreasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environmentwhen there was incomplete or unavailable information.383VI. CEQ DRAFT GUIDANCE ON ASSESSING GHG IMPACTS FROMPROPOSED FEDERAL ACTIONSWith the ever-increasing importance of assessing GHG impacts fromproposed federal actions, and a growing body of case law relative to thatassessing, CEQ developed a guidance document entitled “Draft NEPAGuidance on Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and GreenhouseGas Emissions.”  The draft guidance’s purpose is to assist in explaining how384federal agencies should analyze the environmental effects of a proposedagency action under § 102 of NEPA and the relevant CEQ regulations. Theguidance provides that “if a proposed action would be reasonably anticipated
2to cause direct emissions of 25,000 metric tons or more of CO -equivalentGHG emissions on an annual basis, agencies should consider this an indicatorthat a quantitative and qualitative assessment may be meaningful to decisionmakers and the public.”  However, the guidance is not proposed to be385applicable to federal land and resources management decisions.  Examples386of proposed projects that could potentially fall within the scope of thisguidance include approval of a large solid waste landfill, coal-fired powerplants, or a methane venting coal mine.387
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In evaluating GHG emissions from a project, federal agencies anddepartments should quantify those emissions using technical guidance issuedunder Executive Order 13514. This executive order relates to GHG accountingand reporting, EPA’s mandatory GHG reporting rule, and the Department ofEnergy’s voluntary GHG reporting rule.  If the emissions meet the reportable388thresholds, agencies should consider mitigation measures and reasonablealternatives to reduce GHG emissions.  The CEQ guidance suggests that389among the measures and alternatives to be considered are enhanced energyefficiency, lower GHG-emitting technology, renewable energy, planning forcarbon capture and sequestration, and capturing or beneficially using fugitivemethane emissions.390It is through the scoping process that agencies should determine theappropriate emphasis that should be placed on climate changeconsiderations.  Agencies should consider things like the sensitivity,391location, and time frame of the proposed action in determining that emphasis.Any analysis that emphasizes climate change considerations should considereffects on the environment, public health and safety, and vulnerablepopulations who are more likely to be adversely effected by climate change.392Moreover, “[a]gencies should consider the specific effects of the proposedaction . . . , the nexus of those effects with projected climate change effects onthe same aspects of our environment, and the implications for the environmentto adapt to the projected effects of climate change.”393One example given is an industrial process that may draw water from areduced stream caused by decreased snow pack or significant heat that isexposed to increasing atmospheric temperatures.  Another illustration is a394proposal that would draw copious amounts of water, which would be requireda discussion on changes in water availability associated with climatechange.  In the analysis of any proposed action, agencies should rely on395NEPA’s “rule of reason” to govern the detail in any environmental effectsanalysis related to climate change.396
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The guidance document highlights the importance of identifyingreasonably foreseeable effects. For instance, “[a]gencies should be clear aboutthe basis for projecting the changes from the existing environment to thereasonably foreseeable affected environment, including what would happenunder this scenario and the probability or likelihood of this futurecondition.”397Long-term projects located in areas that are vulnerable to climate changeshould be considered in any analysis. As an example, the guidance discussesthe development of transportation infrastructure located on a barrier islandthat may need design changes to cope with rising sea levels due to climatechange.398The guidance also highlights the importance of adaptive changes relatedto climate change. The guidance notes, “where adaptation to the effects ofclimate change is important, the significant aspects of these changes shouldbe identified in the agency’s final decision and adoption of a monitoringprogram should be considered.”399The guidance recognizes that it is “now well established that rising globalGHG emissions are significantly affecting the Earth’s climate.”  As a result,400all reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the humanenvironment should be identified in any NEPA analysis.  The guidance also401recognizes that “research on climate change impacts is an emerging andrapidly evolving science.”  Consequently, “agencies should consider402uncertainties associated with long-term projections from global and regionalclimate change models.”403VII. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSESenator James Inhofe of Oklahoma introduced legislation in the 111thCongress to prohibit the use of NEPA to document, predict, or mitigate theclimate effects of specific federal actions.  In essence, the bill provides that404compliance with NEPA shall not include consideration of: (1) the greenhousegas emissions, or any climate change effects of those emissions, of a proposed
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405. Id.406. Gov Track, Senate Bill 3230, available at www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-3230(last accessed Dec. 21, 2010).407. Center for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1221.408. Id.
action and alternative actions; or (2) the relationship of climate change effectsto a proposed action or alternatives, including the relationship to proposaldesign, environmental impacts, mitigation, and adaptation measures.  To405date, the U.S. Senate only referred the bill to Committee.406VIII. FUTURE IMPACT CLIMATE CHANGE ANALYSIS WITHIN THENEPA FRAMEWORKAs indicated, there is a robust body of case law that deals with climatechange within the context of NEPA. Federal courts recognize that climatechange impacts can be addressed in NEPA litigation. Failure to address theseimpacts at that initial stage of litigation will almost certainly result in a legalchallenge. Consequently, all parties to any NEPA action—federal agencies,industry, environmental groups, and the public-at-large—should ensure thatclimate change impacts are addressed during the scoping process. Moreover,interested parties should ensure that any concerns they have related to climateimpacts should be submitted during the public comment process or risk failureto establish standing to challenge an agency decision.Potential litigants should also use this body of case law as a means toapply and interpret the NEPA regulations to any proposed federal action. Forinstance, the court in Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA held that theEA’s cumulative impact analysis was inadequate.  The court noted that even407though climate change is a global issue, this does not release an agency fromits duty to assess the effects of its actions on global warming.  The408cumulative impact regulation requires such an assessment.However, the most important development in NEPA litigation is theCEQ’s promulgation of its draft guidance relative to assessing GHG impactsfrom proposed federal actions. This guidance, while still in draft form,provides all parties with a written explanation on how federal agencies shouldanalyze climate change impacts under NEPA and the CEQ regulations. Theexpectation is that failure to follow this draft guidance may result in a legalchallenge. It will be interesting to see if and how courts will apply to guidanceto climate change challenges under NEPA.
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IX. CONCLUSIONIn many respects, the statutory structure of NEPA makes it an idealplanning tool for projects that might impact climate. Unlike the single mediumstatutes, NEPA applies to all federal actions and agencies. Moreover, thisapproach is systematic and interdisciplinary in its in planning anddecisionmaking. As the court in City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA stated, globalwarming is a “new and potentially catastrophic environmental phenomenonthat fits squarely into the broad NEPA framework.”  Consequently, the409development of GHG guidance by the CEQ to use NEPA in a consistentmanner to address climate change concerns in federal planning is a welcomesign that NEPA will remain a relevant tool to combat climate change.
